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This article seeks to provoke that HRM, both as an academic field of study and as a form of 
professional practice, is at risk of impoverishment. The main reasoning for this is because of 
ideological individualism and marketization with an attendant neglect on wider 
organizational, employee and societal concerns.  Following a review of the context of 
financialized capitalism three contemporary developments in HRM are used to illustrate the 
argument: reward strategies; talent management; and high performance work systems 
(HPWS). Implications for the practice of HRM and the way the subject area is taught in 
mainstream business schools are considered.  
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1. Introduction.  
The first wave of provocations in this journal suggest the subject of human resource 
management (HRM) is in a state of unrest: it has been plagued with conceptual problems 
(Thompson, 2011), theory is mostly inadequate to fully explain the links to performance 
(Guest, 2011), and the intellectual space may have been colonized by uncritical positivistic 
psychology (Godard, 2014). Alongside these provocations are the voices of others. Kochan 
(2007) warns of a crisis of legitimacy for the profession, having failed to establish authority 
among higher executives. Marchington (2015) argues that the human resource (HR) function 
has been ‘too busy looking up’ (to the boardroom) by focussing on short-term performance 
metrics to the neglect of long-standing values and concerns of other stakeholders.  
In this provocation we advance the argument that HRM is at risk of intellectual and 
professional impoverishment because of a pro-market ontology rather than a more inclusive 
pro-business orientation. By pro-business we mean a focus on longer-term sustainability of 
both organisations and people, rather than just immediate shareholder interests of profit-
taking. As an approach it embraces a fuller recognition of the interests of wider stakeholders 
beyond shareholders, including employees and community groups. The pro-business idea we 
advocate has potential contributions to make to public policy debates, wider societal 
challenges as well as workplace equity. A pro-business orientation recognises a multitude of 
stakeholders relevant to a business entity, even where some have interests that may differ to 
the immediate objectives of management or other short-term corporate goals. Pro-business 
stakeholders may include employees, trade unions, Non-Government Organisations, Civil 
Society Organisations, charities, suppliers, supply chain networks and community groups.  
The argument is that the pro-market ontology to the way HRM is conceptualised and 
taught, and in turn practiced, means the subject area is at risk of demise. We trace this 
 3 
potential demise to an ‘immiseration effect’1 in the disciplinary field. In the next section we 
briefly chart the neo-liberal framework by drawing on wider political-economic literatures 
behind investor capitalism as forces contributing to hyper-individualism that affect the way 
people are managed at work. Following this we illustrate the ideological driven marketization 
of HRM in relation to three contemporary areas of interest: reward and remuneration; talent 
management; and High Performance Work System (HPWS) debates. Finally, provocations 
concerning the practice of HRM education (its teaching and research) are discussed.  
 
2.   Context: investor capitalism and hyper-individualism 
Several terms have been put forward to describe contemporary capitalism including ‘finance-
led’, ‘financialized capitalism’ or ‘investor capitalism’ (McCann, 2013). Epstein (2005:3) 
defines the financialization of the world economy as the increasing role of financial motives, 
financial markets, financial actors, and financial institutions in the operation of both domestic 
and international economies. One consequence of financialization is that it has resulted in a 
shift in power away from managers to owners, or investors representing the interests of 
owners (Dore, 2008:1102).  Khurana (2007) talks of a movement away from post-second 
world war managerialism to the investor capitalism of today. An implication is that fewer 
owners want or indeed need to have a cooperative relationship with their workforce, suppliers 
or supply chain networks (Batt, 2018). For example in recent times the gig economy portrays 
an arms-length employee-employer relationship in which a greater share of the transactional 
risk shifts to labour, mediated by technology. According to one International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) (2016) study, employees in non-standard employment (e.g. part-time, 
                                                          
1 By ‘immiseration’ we draw on sociological and economic ideas which predict that as capitalism grows and 
extracts greater wealth (capital value), the related conditions of those making the wealth (labour value) goes 
into relative material deprivation over time. The principle is applied here to a potentially impoverished 
practice and educational experience should HRM be taught (and researched) within a paradigm dominated by 
hyper-individualism and hyper-marketization. 
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casual, or self-employed) can face a wage penalty of 30 per cent. Gig economy platforms 
utilising technologies to control work (such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, Uber and 
Deliveroo) may actively by-pass regulatory labour standards with little evidence of such 
organisations nurturing talent or supporting collaborative human capital.  
The pressures on HRM from investor capitalism are wide and varied. On the one hand 
there are exemplar Multinational Corporations (MNCs) that consciously seek to address 
societal challenges such as poverty and inequality (Barrientos, 2013). Unilever, for example, 
pay the Real Living Wage to its UK workforce2 and actively seek to mitigate casual or 
insecure employment among its supplier firms internationally (Wilshaw et al., 2016). On the 
other hand, such companies are often the exception rather than the norm and, where profit 
margins are lower than competitors who take a less socially enlightened approach, they can 
be succeptible to hostile take-overs or corporate raiding (McCann, 2013). It may be argued 
that under such a predatorary regime of financialised capitalism the role of HR becomes 
poised not as a ‘strategic business partner’ or ‘employee champion’ (e.g. Ulrich, 1998), but as 
a ‘handmaiden of efficiency’ required to push through coercive measures to extract greater 
shareholder value such as via labour rationalisation (Kaufman, 2015).  
Financialization has driven the imperative to extract value by squeezing labour costs 
and revenues, heightening the drive towards managerial command and control through a 
proliferation of performance metrics, both in the private and public sectors (Cushen and 
Thompson, 2016). Within this context senior management have become more closely 
supervised by shareholders and private equity consortia. The function of HR may sometimes 
become little more than an ‘administration minder’ for investors when minimizing labour 
costs by implementing wage cuts, reducing employee pensions and benefits, or facilitating 
hostile takeovers and workforce restructuring (Palpacuer et. al., 2011). Managerial pressures 
                                                          
2 https://www.unilever.co.uk/news/press-releases/2015/unilever-signs-up-to-living-wage-foundation.html  
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for a HR strategy that supports  short-term profitability may therefore lead to a ‘pro-market’ 
focus that conflicts with longer term ‘pro-business’ developmental objectives, including 
wider societal interests. 
 The rise of investor capitalism in the latter quarter of the twentieth century can be 
contextualised within a cultural and political framework of neo-liberalism, which has 
influenced management thinking and HR practice. At an overarching level, neo-liberalism is 
an ideological doctrine of political economy that proposes human well-being is best 
progressed by ‘liberating individual entrepreneurship through strong property rights, free 
markets and free trade’ (Harvey, 2005:2). Neo-liberalism provides the ideological basis for 
greater individualism and free market principles to different areas of business and 
management, including HRM. In the political sphere the Regan and Thatcher governments of 
the 1980s in the US and UK provides key historical points of reference for the establishment 
of market-driven individualism which has had a long-lasting imprint on the evolution of 
management. Underpinning the latter is  neo-classical economic theory which provides the 
legitimisation for free market competition, self-interest and individual greed. Arguably, in 
aping the natural sciences, the air of (quasi-) scientific authority afforded by mathematical 
formalization rather than firm empirical evidence was attractive in advancing a more 
politically driven project that re-asserted the rights of capital, clawing back post second world 
war concessions in employment rights and welfare (Standing, 1997). Neo-liberalism involved 
downplaying the importance of wider social and institutional agents, such as trade unions, in 
deregulating (and re-regulating) employment systems towards the interests of capital 
(Standing, 1997; Rubery and Rafferty, 2013). One consequence has been a suspicion of any 
positive collaborative role by coordinating agents along with a mistrust of ‘big government’, 
say in relation to social or welfare expenditure, although not necessary in relation to 
coordinating modern day military investment or banking bailouts. Related social and cultural 
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developments include the coming of age of modern consumerism, where the promotion of 
greater individualism and notions of customer identity take hold through market values that 
also dovetail into employment relations (Donaghey et al, 2014).  
In terms of practical application, the ethical rationale for increased individualism of 
HRM is played out through Adam Smith’s notion that the pursuit of economic self-interest 
leads to the promotion of a greater collective good. The extent of market exclusivity 
pervading management thinking is epitomised in the Friedmanite doctrine that the only social 
responsibility of a business is to (legally) make profit (Friedman, 1970). Although many 
organisations would be reluctant to at least publically ascribe fully to such values, the result is 
an almost unquestioning ideological faith (c.f. religious type belief) in the operation of 
unregulated individual competition over other forms of both internal and external managerial 
organizing. Despite progress for better social regulation and corporate governance of 
organisations, much remains bounded by risk management and market value creation rather 
than ethical concerns. 
The contextual reference point here is that these ideological assumptions are not 
inherently incorrect in their own right. Rather, they require analytical or empirical and ethical 
validation within the context in which they occur. For instance, a cursory glance at history 
highlights that the modern resurgence of individualism is a direct challenge to alternative 
social democratic models of managerial capitalism (e.g. Keynesianism), or the coordinated 
models of continental Europe (Standing, 1997). The paranoia of the cold war and the dash of 
capital supporting centre right governments (beginning in earnest in the economic crises of 
the 1970s), has culminated in an individualisation of work relationships. Alongside such has 
been the burgeoning of a management culture, espousing ideals of excellence, quality or self-
identity as sources of market efficiency (e.g. Peters and Waterman’s 2004 In Search of 
Excellence). Workers are viewed as consumers and market assumptions applied as 
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justifications for employment restructuring as well as workforce well-being. However, such 
market-led ideals are often devoid of critical reflection and management strategy rarely based 
on robust social science evaluations. Furthermore, these debates are not confined to liberal-
market regimes such as the UK or US. In coordinated economies such as Germany, there has 
been a gradual political and economic increase in neo-liberalism. For example, economic and 
employment reforms have minimised job tenure and wage protections (Holst, 2013), paving 
the way for less secure temporary or so-called ‘mini-jobs’ in Germany. In a comparative 
study (covering Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Romania) Koukiadaki et al (2016) 
report post-crisis labour market reforms have advanced a more liberalised agenda across 
diverse and coordinated economic regimes.   
Related to such change is a series of evolutionary managerial practices promoting 
individual people management, many shaped by marketized practices of consumption and 
competition (e.g. in pay). A preoccupation with things like leadership or performance 
management can mean other wider societal challenges are excluded or marginalised from the 
agenda – say concerns about gender pay gaps or inequalities from huge executive pay 
premiums. This may occur, for example, by viewing individualism as some form of baseline 
human condition predicated on evolutionary principles or quasi-scientific neo-classic 
economic laws, rather than seeing it as variable, socially constructed, and historically-
determined over time.  
Arguably, extensive individual self-interest actually runs counter to the social nature of 
human beings as well as contrary to how most organisations actually function. Even Hayek, 
the doyen of free market principles, contended that people are inherently social and collective 
beings; at the same time as operating in more individualised modern societal contexts, people 
spent a large proportion of human history living in tribes or small collectives. In the grand 
scheme of human history, contemporary society and its modern market consumerism is a 
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relatively recent development. Free markets, rather than being reified as somehow 
ontologically ‘natural’, were seen as part of an ‘extended order’ to break down innate 
tribalism and minimise the risk of social conflict and economic instability it was perceived to 
engender (Hayek, 1988). In practical terms, it is simply too difficult for mangers to manage 
work relationships via absolute individualism. Indeed, modern initiatives for things like 
cooperative team-working or empowerment actually reinforces a collective structure to the 
way organizations are run and managed. A great deal of business activity also regularly relies 
on collaboration and coordination (e.g. across supply chains or alliance partnerships) rather 
than absolute individual competition. 
While people inside organisations provide a legitimate basis for HRM and 
employment research, this does not mean that all social phenomena can or indeed should be 
suitably explained in individualistic terms alone (List and Spiekermann, 2013). HRM in 
organisations cannot be fully understood in an atomic sense isolated from economic, social 
and institutional interconnecting relationships. Part of the individualist ideological bias 
permeates from the fact that HRM as a field of practice has had an orientation towards 
promoting corporate objectives rather than wider well-being concerns. Literatures on 
organizational excellence and culture, such as Peters and Waterman (2004), illustrate the 
implicit tensions with organizations promoting a ‘double think’ by, on the one hand, 
engaging with the seductive competitive sporting metaphors  of  ‘winners and losers’ whilst, 
on the other hand, also seeking to align such ideals to a normative view of unitary 
organizational culture (Wilmott, 1993).  
The ontological and methodological dominance of hyper-individualism in HRM has 
not gone unchallenged (Harley, 2015; Rubery et al, 2016). Calls for the development of 
collectivist approaches to HRM is not about redressing the demise of a weakened trade union 
movement but echoes the need to better understand if or how HRM can transfer from 
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dominant hegemonic contexts (e.g. US, UK or Australia) to other diverse cultures (e.g. 
China, India or Asia), where alternative customs and religious antecedents may not square-up 
with the hyper-individualistic principles of HRM (Ji et al., 2011). In the following section we 
draw out some of the effects of the aforementioned ideological assumptions in three selected 
HRM practice areas: reward strategies, talent management, and HPWS. The argument we 
make here is not that market principles, individualism and competition are somehow 
fundamentally bad or cannot have positive roles within HRM, organizational practice or 
society: the provocation we illustrate is that such ideological hegemony elevates exclusivity 
for free market doctrines, yet so-called free choices are regulated by the power of investor 
capitalism to the neglect of other more collaborative and inclusive people management roles 
espousing well-being, fairness and equality which should be embedded in HRM. 
 
3. The marketization of HRM, in practice 
The inequality of reward strategies 
Reward strategies in many organisations legitimise the size of gaps in pay across the 
corporate ladder and reinforce a ‘winners vs losers’ mentality. The development of HRM as a 
field of practice has been inextricably linked with the move away from collective 
relationships over issues such as pay-setting, towards choices reflecting a broader 
individualisation of the employment relationship. It has long been realised that reward 
management relates to perceptions of justice regarding the extent to which employees view as 
fair their remuneration (distributive justice), how resources are allocated (procedural justice), 
and the attendant impacts on social relationships (interactional justice) and ultimately 
employee satisfaction and commitment (Gelens et. al., 2013: 343). While such judgements 
may be based partly on ‘objective’ criteria (e.g. comparison of performance metrics between 
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employees or market rates), they also have a subjective component (Hofmans, 2012).  As 
such they are culturally bounded by beliefs and norms regarding value creation and 
distribution, legitimising an assumption of natural rights of managers or some other seniority 
principle within the social order.  
The concern here is not just about the distribution and allocation of resources but the 
sheer ‘magnitude’ of inequality. Piketty (2014) documents income distribution over the 
previous two centuries, showing that neo-liberal regimes have relatively greater inequality. 
For example, since the late 1800s the top percentile of the population owned around 90 per 
cent of all wealth. Between the 1930s until late 1970s, the inequality gap narrowed 
considerably, in part because of government policy to provide social welfare, taxation, as 
well as collective bargaining that helped share the allocation of national income. However, 
since the late 1970s the rise of hyper-individualism saw income inequality burgeon 
significantly. In the US, UK and elsewhere executive pay skyrocketed in the 1990s (Kaplan, 
2012).  
Discussions of poverty tend to be viewed as the remit of public or government policy, 
with a focus on the role of state institutions and welfare policy. The implications of HRM 
contributing to income and wealth distribution, or more recently in-work poverty, receive 
little attention. In the UK there are now more people living in poverty who are at work than 
out of paid employment (Lupton et al, 2016). The role of HRM in shaping narratives about 
how economic value is created within organisations, such as through practices of 
‘performance’, ‘talent’ and ‘leadership’  affects equality and inequality in wider society, 
partly through re-defining the discursive categories by which value is rewarded and 
remuneration apportioned across organisational hierarchies (Avent-Holt and Tomaskovic-
Devey, 2010). Indeed, it is perhaps no accident that two of the countries in the developed 
world that have seen the largest increases in income inequality, the UK and US, are those 
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where market-based incentives and an individualised employment relationship have 
dominated in HR models.  
Although such issues are not restricted to upper organisational echelons, hyper- 
individualism has also provided an ideological justification for rewarding so-called ‘super-
managers’ (Piketty, 2014) linked to the modern cult of leadership, or at least the individual 
leader. In this sense the reward strategies of organizational HR systems and discursive 
practices are connected to social and economic inequality through valorising the contribution 
of executives within firms. There are at least two views that can be taken on super-managers’ 
executive compensation. On the one hand is the individualistic assumption of free-market 
principles that suggests high income earners receive the market value for their labour skill 
and contribution (Dicks, 2012).  On the other hand, a less politically and socially naive 
account may highlight how managerial power means that, in the presence of weak or 
unregulated corporate governance regimes, managers are able to extract rents due to their 
entrenched position of authority within an organisational or broader corporate world 
hierarchy, leading to higher levels of self-justified compensation. Rather than objective 
executive remunerated value, such rent-seeking behaviours occur across the economy, 
pushing-up market rates even higher (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004), augmented through 
discourses of value creation and leadership. The external equity defence that market value 
determines efficient rewards therefore overlooks that market rates are partly politically but 
also socially constructed. In this sense, the definition of skill (value) becomes determined by 
patterns of power and advantage, yet wrapped-up in a discourse of market rationalisation, 
individualism and a cult of leadership. To this end market ideology couched in managerial 
rhetoric masquerades or hides the true privilege of an executive group. It is not, we suggest, 
‘pro-business’ in that it distorts an understanding of productivity and remains exclusive to a 
dominant class. Research does show a questionable link between executive pay and 
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performance, and on-going shareholder revolt against excessive corporate remuneration 
appears to sit well with such an interpretation (Weijia & Young, 2016). 
The argument about executive compensation highlights a fundamental problem that 
has broader implications for HRM: that is, the difficulty in objectively attributing value to 
labour, particularly in higher discretion roles where standard job evaluation tools are often 
too blunt as job performance criteria. In this regard, rather than positioning an empirical 
defence for levels of high executive remuneration, Kaplan (2012) concedes that it remains 
difficult to ascertain whether levels of managerial pay are in fact efficient. With the decline in 
collective bargaining to provide regulatory checks and balances to determine pay or distribute 
wealth, and with HRM either sitting too close to senior management or being powerless to 
disarm dominant ideologies, the argument for alternative models of reward to shake-up 
traditional notions of organisational privilege appear wanting at best. Despite the impacts on 
broader social inequality, a genuine evaluation of remuneration strategies is often 
conspicuously absent within CSR debates, as are levels of profit taking compared to 
organisational and workforce reinvestment. 
In sum, HRM and particularly reward strategies cannot be divorced from wider social 
class inequalities or the rise of in-work poverty. In this extracted example HRM underpins an 
individualistic determination of pay, shaped in part by hierarchical power, yet rationalized on 
false presumptions of market freedoms. It thus advances a pro-market privilege over pro-
business inclusivity.  
 
Talent management and the cult of the individual 
Talent Management (TM) is a newer yet equally dominant lexis in the intellectual and 
practitioner HRM space. As a business objective TM emerged in the early 2000s, initially 
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offered as a consultancy product by the likes of McKinsey to recruit and retain key staff in a 
‘War for Talent’ (McDonald, 2013; McDonnell, 2011). Academic curiosity and practitioner 
interest in TM has blossomed: research projects, monographs, doctoral theses, special issues 
of peer-reviewed journals have all expanded (Scullion et al., 2010; Farndale et al., 2010; Al-
Ariss et al., 2014). The European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management run a regular 
workshop dedicated to TM, while Oxford University Press now has a handbook ‘The Oxford 
Handbook to Talent Management’. In the latter Collings et al (2017) chart an upward 
trajectory for TM in terms of related publications, practitioner and scholarly interest and a 
growing citation base. For example, Collings et al (2017) report some 16,000,000 Google hits 
for TM (at the time of their writing, in December 2016). They explain this is significant since 
the topic first emerged only in the mid-1990s3. It thus appears the subject is not only here to 
stay but is likely to grow. 
A concern is not with TM per se but rather the analysis seeking to classify people in 
relation to some innate abstracted form (‘talent’). Our argument is that TM projects a 
marketized discourse that favours capital, is mostly atheoretical, and neglects other legitimate 
stakeholder interests and wider societal concerns. We do not suggest these are absolute or 
definitive positions of fact: we present a counter view that is part of a broader argumentation 
about a potential immiseration risk to the field of HRM, of which TM is a newer explication. 
There appears a disturbing lack of clarity about how to define TM (Lewis and 
Heckman, 2006:140). It is generally regarded as a way to ‘attract, select and develop the best 
possible employees in more strategic ways’ (Sparrow et al, 2014:27). A key issue here is a 
lack of theoretical pedigree, with Al-Ariss et al (2014) concluding that theoretical 
development has at best been slow. A glance at the TM literature finds a strong association 
                                                          
3 For interest we did a short comparison of citations on Google: ‘Human Resource Management’ returned 
68,200,000 hits; ‘Strategic HRM’ 15,900,000; ‘Employment Relations’ scored 64,300,000 returns; ‘Employee 
Voice’ obtained 20,100,000 returns (as of December 2017, when ‘Talent Management’ returned 61,100,000, 
which is a five-fold increase since Collings et al’s search in December 2016).  
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not to a new paradigm but well established and mostly unitarist ideals of what HRM entails: 
psychological contract, human capital, social capital, resource-based view, strategic value, or 
ability-motivation-opportunity (AMO) (Collings, 2014).   
Definitional and theoretical ambiguity aside, several hyper-market orientations can 
be traced in TM debates which we suggest, in part, may benefit from a more critical 
examination. First, there is a view that without any clear theoretical architecture TM is simply 
another label for HRM, writ large. On the one hand TM may be viewed as a fashionable ‘fad’ 
with little distinctive contribution: that is ‘old wine in new bottles’ (Collings, 2014a). TM 
could also be seen as a project that seeks to colonise and take-over HRM, incorporating 
within it all the aspects of people management such recruitment, selection, development, 
training and rewards (Lewis and Heckman, 2006). Such a concern may be indifferent or 
meaningless. After all, HRM has itself been labelled as refashioned personnel management 
with a stronger individualistic unitary posture (Storey and Sisson, 1993). On the other hand, 
however, TM contributions can take on an altogether different or more coercive undertone. 
For example an ‘inclusive’ approach to TM may be equitable in seeking to appreciate all 
employees for their unique and discrete contributions, although there is no reason to assume 
that all employees want to move to more senior leadership or higher talent roles. In contrast is 
an ‘exclusive’ model that advocates a differentiation capacity, where select individuals are 
deemed as top talent and selected to be in a talent pool (Meyers and van Woerkon, 2014). It is 
an issue that has not gone unchallenged (Thunnissen et al., 2013). Issues relate to ‘how, who 
and on what basis’ employees are selected for the ‘exclusive’ talent pool. Criteria is usually 
argued to be linked to value creation, profit and performance-enhancements or based on 
strategic alignment to corporate goals. Examples range from customer-facing workers who 
are aligned with sales targets and customer satisfaction, to succession planning for key senior 
roles within organisations. However, we counter that TM is predominantly market 
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(performance) driven, to the neglect of adding understanding about wider employment 
relationship dynamics, employee well-being or organisational purpose. A corollary of the 
‘exclusive’ TM approach is that those employees who fulfil important (essential) back-office 
functions become undervalued, with attendant morale and productivity problems 
(Marchington, 2015:177). Indeed some of the deeper employment issues hardly ever receive 
attention in the TM literatures, such as actor and agency influences, institutional constraints, 
social relationships, cooperation and resistance, voice, participation, emotional labour 
tensions, stress, or worker dignity (Thunnissen et al, 2013:330).  
It may be that the ‘War for Talent’ is less abrasive or aggressive than when it was 
first touted by management consultants. Yet language sends signals and messages to 
employees and stakeholders about employer intent, providing the conceptual frameworks 
through which people construct their understandings of the social reality of the workplace. 
The idea of talent competition echoes an image of warfare between rival firms. In HRM such 
a discourse can undermine constructive competition and collaboration within a workplace, 
with warfare ‘between’ employees becoming normalised (Bunting, 2011). A stark illustration 
of these issues comes through the use of ‘forced rankings’. When exclusive groups of staff 
are deemed ‘top-performers’ (‘A’ star players) to be rewarded, based on un-negotiated rules 
or managerial views of market criteria, other people are devalued as ‘poor-performers’ (‘C’ 
graded workers) and put on review plans or managed out of the organisation (Michaels et al., 
2001). The emotional and equitable distribution of exclusive TM pools or forced rankings is 
rarely discussed. Indeed, counter-productive consequences may ensue with a vicious cycle of 
demotivation spill-over: those who do not receive the label ‘top talent’ or ‘high potential’ 
receive fewer resources, less training and may become alienated if not actively disengaged. 
Just as in high school where the most academically talented are not necessarily those who are 
the best at competitive sport, it also does not necessarily follow that employees with the 
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sharpest elbows also have the sharpest brains. In this way TM practices may result in 
workforce diversity problems. For example organisations that focus on fierce employee 
competition as a talent identification process can create a culture of work intensification and 
long-hours. This may favour younger and male employees without children, while 
disadvantaging older workers and those with care responsibilities or women who, through an 
unequal division of domestic labour, may not be able to match the participation rates of such 
hyper-competitive norms. Therefore excessive competition is not necessarily always the best 
way to identify or nurture talent and may even be damaging to longer-term strategic 
objectives. 
In sum, it is argued TM is rather narrow, largely atheoretical and a one-dimensional 
approach favouring market (performance) rationality. We suggest that a more holistic and 
inclusive plural approach to HR practices is required to add legitimacy and equity to the topic 
or, better still, drop the nomenclature of TM altogether.  
 
High Performance Work Systems (HPWS) and shareholder sovereignty 
The idea that HRM can positively affect firm performance has advanced considerably over 
the last decade. Although there is no accepted definition of HPWS, it is often taken to imply a 
non-Taylorist structure of management that includes a bundle of innovative HR practices and 
work processes that are mutually reinforcing, and which correlate to performance 
improvements at both the individual employee and organisational levels (Boxall et al., 2011). 
The story is well known. Early studies evidenced a strong statistical association between 
certain bundles of HR practices and profit, turnover or productivity (e.g. Huselid, 1995). 
Many of the initial methodological designs were found wanting - either for relying on single 
managerial respondents using simplistic postal survey instruments, or for neglecting to 
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consider worker attributions of HRM (Paauwe, 2009). Subsequent research has advanced the 
field: employee voices are now considered in the analysis; debates address issues about HR 
system strength; employee well-being is realised as an important outcome; and various 
mediating factor influences such as work climate, trust, satisfaction and commitment enhance 
understanding (Innocenti et al., 2011; Farndale et al., 2011). Systematic reviews and meta-
analysis have developed better conceptual understanding about HPWS and the practical 
implications for the profession (see reviews from Coombes et al., 2006; Paauwe, 2009; Van 
De Voorde et al., 2012). Beer (2015:417) comments that most ‘Chief Executives know HR 
improves performance, but what they need to understand is how to develop sustainable and 
positive work related systems’. We don’t disagree. However, we provoke that there remains, 
in part at least, a unitary orientation that privileges shareholder returns and marketization over 
a wider plurality of sustainable and socially-embedded practices.  
There are debates about alternative ontological and methodological foundations used to 
unpick some of the core performance and well-being claims of HRM, including econometric 
modelling, behavioural psychology, labour process or post-structural analysis (among others). 
Peccei et al (2013) point out that there are various knowledge paradigms to interpreting the 
rationale for and outcomes of HPWS. One is labelled the pessimistic (or conflicting) outcome 
approach, in which HRM leads to improved firm performance, although in so doing it results 
in harmful worker outcomes such as stress and work intensification (e.g. Ramsay et al, 2000). 
In contrast is a mutual gains (or optimistic) paradigm, with HRM enhancing both firm 
performance while simultaneously boosting worker well-being (Boxall and Macky, 2014). 
However there can be problems with mutuality, which may vary between weak or strong 
variants and as a distinct concept mutuality is not without concern (Peccei et al, 2013:22; 
Boxall and Macky, 2014). For example, mainstream texts can dismiss critical findings about 
work intensification as unwarranted grumbles or that radical scholars misunderstand the true 
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intentions of executives when they refer to mutuality or collaboration (Morrell and 
Learmonth, 2015:527). Outcomes such as well-being, productivity or mutuality do not 
constitute a set of free choices somehow selected by organisational leaders for and on behalf 
of subordinates. Dobbins and Gunnigle (2009) find that mutuality can be determined by 
various exogenous factors, some of which are beyond the immediate control of managers. 
Geary and Triff (2011) also show that while all parties can gain something from mutual 
collaboration, in practice it is highly constrained owing to the power resource allocations of 
management. 
Nonetheless, the advancement of a more positive employment relationship with 
performance-enhancing and well-being outcomes remains a legitimate goal. Guest (2011) 
suggests that in order to better understand the HR-performance link there is a need to move 
beyond an exclusive market validation, when he calls for a more inclusive integration of 
actors with a specific employee interest agenda. Guest (2017) subsequently presents a 
framework to prioritise the promotion of better employment with a concerted focus on well-
being. The approach is a potential game-changer. It argues, with aplomb, for better 
employment and better management as a legitimate ethical standard. It persuasively connects 
better employment to improved HR management and then firm performance. In other words 
it prioritises the processes of people management ahead of prescriptive configured HR 
practices leading to anticipated market-based performance gains.  
At the same time, however, there are issues to consider. One is the model remains 
normative and somewhat idealised, at least until researchers unpick its dimensions and test 
potential causal inter-connections. Such empirical scrutiny would be a welcome direction for 
the field. Another issue is much of the focus gravitates around psychological well-being, 
reflecting a particular disciplinary approach that may favour a micro-dominated positivistic 
epistemology to the neglect of context, politics, social networks or the historical and macro 
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institutions affecting performance decisions (Allen et al, 2016). It is known that the meanings 
and measures of employee well-being can differ by type, form and level (Van De Voorde et 
al, 2012). Thus an approach predicated on individualism may define well-being in very 
different ways to an approach that predicts collective voice or representation to be preferable 
or more important. Other approaches differ between well-being ‘in’ work and well-being 
‘from’ work (Muñoz De Bustillo et al., 2011). The well-being ‘from’ work approach has a 
primary concern on the psychological and economic effects of unemployment. It captures 
issues around depression and/or self-esteem at community group and individual levels. In 
contrast, the well-being ‘in’ work approach examines the effects of work reorganisation and 
change on employee job satisfaction as a facet of well-being. A key motive is to link worker 
well-being to organisational outcomes for performance. While both approaches may be 
mutually inclusive and drawn from psychological insight, the well-being ‘in’ work approach 
may have a greater tendency to privilege economic performance for the firm ahead of wider 
societal or worker well-being objectives (Warhurst et al., 2017).    
It may transpire, therefore, that different approaches to the study of employee well-
being profit or disadvantage one category of worker over another; akin to the market-driven 
inequalities concerning exclusive TM pools discussed earlier (e.g. ‘core’ individuals 
privileged over ‘peripheral’ or ‘casual’ staff). Indeed, HRM is not necessarily received by all 
occupational groups in a uniform manner as manual, white-collar and technical workers have 
been reported to experience the impact of high-performance work systems differently 
(Cafferkey and Dundon, 2015). Guest (2017) further alerts us to wide variability about the 
meanings underpinning well-being, with up to 10 different antecedents4 indicating the 
contestable ancestry to the concept of employee well-being.  
                                                          
4 Different well-being antecedents include: ‘opportunity for control’, ‘skill use’, ‘work variety’, ‘interpersonal 
contact’, ‘externally generated goals’, ‘environmental clarity’, ‘money’, ‘physical security’, ‘valued social 
position’.  
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Notwithstanding good intentions to embrace an employee-centric agenda, a potential 
immiseration risk is that workforce well-being may become associated with labour rights 
‘green-washing’; that is HPWSs may appear to promote employee well-being with a 
stakeholder-friendly or positive ethical orientation, but only at surface level. Under regimes 
of austerity and investor capitalism, it is usually labour that is sacrificed to market 
imperatives (Thompson and Harley, 2012). Methodologically, therefore, HPWS and 
employee well-being issues could be advanced further by expanding into areas of 
sociological inquisition, ethnography or drawing on observational and participant observation 
research designs that are prevalent in other social science fields.  
In sum, HPWS as a topic has advanced in terms of quality and the quantity of 
knowledge and research designs. Yet, for all these advances, the underlying ontology favours 
exclusivity towards market returns, which, we contend, can weaken the field. Guest’s (2017) 
proposed framework offers a distinctively nuanced proposal.  We further provoke that, even 
when worker well-being is premised on good intentions, it can appear managerialist in tone 
and depict an agenda of what employee well-being ‘ought’ to mean in the eyes of managers, 
not necessarily workers, and it may further be ignorant of wider societal challenges. Attention 
towards the connections between how people are managed and objectives for equity, 
sustainability and well-being remain important areas for the field which may be shaped by 
issues other than an exclusive market performativity. 
 
4. The immiseration of HRM Education? 
In this section we make a final suggestion that the marketization and hyper-
individualisation of the theory, practice and study of HRM risks an educational immiseration. 
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We do not claim all who teach and research HRM (and employment and work related 
subjects) actively impoverish the field. The implication is that a marketized ideology has 
become manifest in some (many) business school structures of learning. Reflections on the 
nature of university business school learning have been advanced elsewhere (Fernández-
Rodriguez, 2014; Parker, 2015; Dundon et al, 2017). We suggest here a pro-business 
manifesto for those concerned with employment and managerial goals, drawing on socially 
constructed notions of knowledge and social science rather than an exclusive pro-market 
ideology. There are of course other voices contributing and advancing these issues. The 
Academy of Management (AoM) has a critical management stream that exposes corporate 
issues and debates about important societal linkages (Rowlinson and Hassard, 2011). In the 
UK the CIPD has an Applied Research Conference to try and better engage academic 
researchers and HR practitioners. We know also there exist knowledge streams among 
business schools in terms of sociology, politics, heterodox economics, critical and positive 
psychology, post-structural heuristics, or anthropology and ethnography (among others). Of 
importance is that business and management education remains a formidable force capable of 
shaping wider society and connections with policy-makers, agencies, charities, citizens, 
communities, governments as well as business and practitioner gurus. The value a society 
places on its citizens is not divorced from the way people are managed and regulated at work. 
Encouraging students to understand broader socio-political and social science reflexivities is 
not about abstract artefacts: these debates go to the heart of intellectual stimulation that will 
encourage a deeper cognitive engagement with things like strategy, planning, corporate 
governance, institutional constraints and choices along with wider business objectives. 
It is evident there are divergent pedagogies; for example in several European 
environments such as Spain, Germany, Italy and Nordic states a broader social science 
approach can be evidenced (Fernández-Rodriguez, 2014). We suggest, nonetheless, a bias 
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towards a dominant market discourse traced to the likes of the Wharton School in the US - 
named after Joseph Wharton, owner of the Bethlehem Steel Company that facilitated FW 
Taylor’s scientific management theory - as the first business school in 1881 advocating the 
interests of capital (Grey, 2009). From the 1950s American business schools institutionalised 
learning by transmitting, what Fernández-Rodriguez (2014: 186) argues, has been a particular 
‘American way of business’ that favoured a liberal capitalist model of accumulation and 
private ownership. The legacy has not abated and if anything may have heightened the push 
towards free market orientations and neo-liberal hegemony under investor capitalism. The 
lynchpin corporations at the epicentre of the 2008 global financial crash (e.g. Lehman 
Brothers) and other notable corporate scandals in recent history (e.g. Enron) were led by 
executives educated through a university business school model (Grey, 2009).      
The legacy is students may be taught in ways that favour the exclusivist market 
ontology we have cautioned. In many programmes of learning case studies offer great utility 
to apply context and issue-based sensitivities. However, students are usually encouraged to 
‘step into the shoes of managers or leaders’ rather than consider implications for other 
legitimate actor groups, or rarely address broader societal challenges connected to HRM and 
employer actions. Bridgman et. al., (2016) argue the legitimacy of business school education, 
especially in the aftermath of huge austerity, can be undermined by narrow pedagogy. They 
posit a counter historical narrative to the acclaimed Harvard Business School case study 
method of learning, favoured by many other business schools across the world as somehow 
best practice. Bridgman et. al (2016) advocate incorporating other key stakeholders to 
consider issues about performance or equity (e.g. labour unions) and reflective learning in 
order to learn about agency processes, rather than improve vested-interest (employer) 
objectives. Petrick (2012) shows how a wider plurality of stakeholder perspectives enhance 
deeper cognitive knowledge about issues and factors, rather than ready-made solutions 
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presumed to fix the design of an inclusive or exclusive TM strategy or to incentivise 
executives via a bespoke remuneration package.  
There is an evidence-based management movement that may provide a way forward 
for some of these tensions (Cascio, 2007). Evidence-based management seeks to apply all 
sources of information to help better inform learning and applied decision-making. At the 
same time, however, large quantitative surveys or comparative case studies are not 
necessarily in or of themselves any more evidence-based (Briner and Rousseau, 2011:11). 
Executives also have ideologies, customs and habits, and no matter what the extent of 
multiple sources of evidence they may simply not accept a suggested (evidence-based) 
recommendation should that feel unpalatable for a whole host of biased reasons. Take, for 
example, the role of trade union representation. Certain employers, no matter how many 
sources of data inform the case that representative voice can be effective and fair, some 
executives (and indeed governments) are simply not prepared to share power (Gall and 
Dundon, 2013). In this way, therefore, evidence-based management may not deliver what it 
claims. Morrell and Learmonth (2014) caution that such approaches can be narrow (e.g. data 
sources can be confined to a single or small discipline, such as a neo-classical economic or 
particular psychological view of HRM), or evidence-based research may be biased (e.g. 
managerialist because it sees corporate executives as fee-paying clients).  
The implications of the foregoing are numerous for the practice and learning of HRM. 
One issue of note is that the potential demise (immiseration risk) of HRM we provoke is not 
definitive or certain. It may be that the teaching of HRM has neglected advances in wider and 
more critical social science knowledge, or in other ways it may incorporate them. Unless the 
interests of a particular scholar or an institutional objective ascribes to certain approaches and 
values, it may be rare for the typical business school student to get to grips with alternatives 
to hyper-individualisation and extreme forms of marketized governance. Pro-market 
 24 
orientations become normalised in the classroom, even if unintentionally. Students reading 
sociology, politics, history, heterodox or alternative economics, or those enrolled on a global 
development programme are probably more likely to understand  broader contextual social 
issues such as the working conditions of those who are ‘coerced to live’ in a supply chain 
factory dormitory. In contrast, HRM students can probably define a few prescriptive pros and 
cons of an appraisal system, a training plan, or the core and peripheral components of a 
(hypothetical) flexible firm model; all of which are usually rationalised as some efficiency 
tool for and behalf of market-driven client needs (e.g. shareholders). However, it is possible 
few will learn to reflect critically about fragmented organisational boundaries, supply chain 
networks, in-work poverty, gender and inequality, covert union de-recognition strategies, or 
whether an employer’s motive for some new performance management system could be to 
reduce the wage bill or tighten disciplinary control over people (Taylor, 2017).    
The future of HRM need not be viewed pessimistically. Some may caution about 
pressures from accreditation to standardise the field of HRM that may narrow the subject area 
to market-driven objectives. For many business schools formal management-led accreditation 
is typically considered a ‘must-have’, which can raise tensions about what is and what should 
be taught on HRM degrees. It is perhaps more important to support the study ‘of’ HRM and 
employment than prescribe to any standard efficiency rationale or stand-alone accreditation. 
Workplace equality; employee health, safety and welfare; participation and fairness; dignity 
and respect are all core aspects of the ways in which people are managed. Universities and in 
particular the role of business schools within them can be diverse and creative. Friedmanite 
neo-liberal doctrines that emanated from the Chicago School may treat the subject much 
differently to those promoting a plurality of wider goals to embrace fairness as well as 
efficiency. Yet the richness of studying such diversity is what can make for a more informed 
social science anchor point to the study of work and employment in a global society. Indeed 
 25 
there is good reason to be upbeat about the subject, its potential pedagogy, public policy 
contributions, the cognitive capability and imagination of students and future practitioners, 
and the positive learning inspired from also knowing what doesn’t work instead of just 
reimaging investor returns as the alpha and omega of HRM theory and practice. To some 
extent this is a call to academics and practitioners in the area to be bolder and push for more 
inclusive and socially sustainable practices.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper is a provocation and as such many of its ideas are suggestive and purposely 
debatable. Many readers of HRMJ may disagree and have an alternative passion and better 
approach to how the subject is or ought to be taught and researched. We know there are 
colleagues and institutions that underpin culturally-rich research and socially-engaging 
educational experiences that move beyond either an explicit or implicit reproduction of neo-
liberalism. There are however others (many) who do not. Our suggestion for a pro-business 
focus is different to managerialism. Beyond investor returns it includes a greater reflection on 
business development and sustainability of wider stakeholders such as employees, their 
representative bodies (union and non-union), social agents, employer associations, NGOs, 
CSOs, and labour market institutions. In contrast, the pro-market ideology and hyper-
individualisation of HRM we have cautioned risks both applied practice as well as an 
educational impoverishment. This of course is not certain. Academics, researchers, policy-
makers, practitioners and professional associations can reconfigure the way HRM is 
understood, taught and potentially practiced in the future.      
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